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I. Introduction
. UrcitxC.States r,L.!,era.-Plaza cracked the door into the long r';ithst6ndi6g.belicf'that
experts could distinguish and identiff fingerprints, and accurately testify in courts across the
United States.r Llera held that the ability of experts on fingerprinting to be able to identify a
latent fingerprint, and deem it to come from a particular individual could not be demonstrated.2
This ruling shocked Federal Prosecutors and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as this method
of identiffing individuals in crime scenes has been a staple in their investigations for decades. As
a result, expert witnesses were no longer allowed to do more than inform the jury of fingerprint
similarities.3 The ability to testiff that a defendant was the source of a fingerprint in question was
no longer permissible following this order.a
Less than four months passed when Judge Louis H. Pollak of the Pennsylvania District
Court completely changed his mind in Llera II.s "l completely disagree with myself'were the
five words that brought smiles to the prosecution's faces, but left heavy doubt on the abilities of
experts on fingerprinting lingering.6 Could an expert witness in fingerprinting truly offer
testimony that helps to identifr a latent print with an individual on trial for a criminal matter,
with certainty high enough to sentence that person to confinement for years or life? For 100
years, the answer to this, without much question was yes, however Judge Pollak may have
I United States v. Llerq Plaza, l8l F. Srpp. 2d 414 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
s Uniled States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
6 https://www.latimes.com/archives lla-xpm-2002-mar-14-mn-32820-story.html
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created a hump in the road to make people think twice. Judge Pollak was correct in his initial
decision.
,.- "', 4...^ a1.rflt . .6.
II. Wfrr,'fr "" E,*p.rfiVitnlss and How Does It Apply to Fingerprints?
It is important to understand the distinction between an expert witness and a regular, lay
witness. A lay witness does not need to enter their opinions in advance to the court before trial.
Under Rule 701, a lay witness may provide a lay witness may provide an opinion that is (1)
rationally based on the witness's perception; (2) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of rule 702.7
Under United States Federal law, the Daubert standard is the rule of evidence that guides the
admissibility of an expert witness testimony in courtrooms across the nation.s Under Rule 702,
the judge has the task of "gatekeeping" and assures that expert testimony comes from scientific
knowledge.e Rule 702 states, "lf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testi$r thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." l0 Expert witnesses offer the court
insight into knowledge that a lay witness would not be able to accurately verbalize and
7 https ://www. law.cornell .edtr/rules/fre/rule
8 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. lnc.,509 U.S. 579 (1993)-
e Id.
to Id.
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understand in enough detail to help the factfinder with their decision as to whether it should have
considerable importance in the proceeding.
". Outside of the Daubert standard, nor:.scientists.Li.ke fi.ngerprinting experts should be rvere *
deemed to testify on technical or other specialized knowledge in Kumho Tire.tl Daubert dealt
only with scientific knowledge, therefore the court stated thatjudges should act as gatekeepers,
and that there was no "convincing need" to distinguish the difference between scientific and
technical knowledge, and instead to ensure that the expert's testimony would be outside ofthe
averagejuror's grasp.l2 This ruling is what solidified the ability for expert witness' to testify in
United States courts, even on topics that do not necessarily have scientific foundations, such as,
blood splatter, and car mechanics. However, fingerprinting experts, as will be discussed in the
cases in this paper, hold themselves out to be scientific for testimonial purposes, not "technical
or other specialized knowledge."
The first major case in 1923 conceming admissibility of expert testimony under 702 was
Frye v. United Stales.13 The case hetd that testimony of experts was admissible only if the
technique involved to produce the evidence was "generally accepted" as reliable in the scientific
community.14 This was only binding in the D.C. circuit, but numerous jurisdictions adopted the
test and used it moving forward.rs This led to the quick acceptance of fingerprinting experts to
have the ability to testi$, simply because they were historically doing so, as will be discussed in
the below section named, "History of Fingerprinting Usage."
tt Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,526 U.S. 137,119 S. Ct. I167 (1999).
12 Id.
t3 Frye r. United States,293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
t4 Id. at 1014.
15 Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of Frye v.
United States,48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1993).
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Relating to Rule 702 United States v. Mitchell was a Daubert heaing to challenge the
science of fingerprinting.l6 The issue was whether small areas of latent prints were unique as
. rvell as fi,l!, and.complete prints.17 Obviously, when ra!.ilg prints"ftom a.crime scene there will
not be perfect, full prints available, so the question expanded to the ability to use experts in
.p6rtial prints. However, the Court did not make a ruling on this specific question, due to the
requirement ofproof of conflicting evidence in order to explore the question, as well as the
meaningless error in this specific case that the question posed.ls The opinion ofthe case also
failed to address the major question of the Daubert hearing ofwhether fingerprinting was a
science.l' The court's opinion said that it did not establish. "a categorical rule that larent
fingerprint evidence is admissible in the Circuit, but nothing in the opinion should be read to
require extensive Daubert hearings in every case involving latent fingerprint evidence."20 The
Court doubled down by asserting, "a District court would not abuse its discretion by limiting, in
a proper case, the scope of Daubert heaings to novel challenges to the admissibility of latent
fingerprint identification evidence or even dispensing with the hearing altogether if no novel
challenge was raised".2l This further avoided a concrete answer on fingerprinting, and gave
courts in the Third Circuit the blueprint to refuse Dauberl hearings on fingerprinting unless the
arguments differed from the 5 day hearingin Mitchell.
Then Llera-Plaza and Llera-Plaza 11 flip flopped between the ability of an expert to give an
opinion of whether a latent print was a match to an individual. As earlier described, Judge Pollak
16 United States v. Mitchell,365 F.3d 215,255 (3d Cir. 2004).
t1 Id.
18 Id.
1e Id. at255.
20 Id.
2t Id.
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challenged the statistical validity of fingerprinting experts in both ofhis Llera-Plaza opinions.
He concluded that the field has failed to test its assumptions and claims ofexpertise.22 Judge
Pollak that.th"-most co.rrr-.on.nethod of fingerprinting (which r"rilI.be. detailed.helorv,.called
"ACE-V") did not meet the first three Daubert factors, simply only meeting the general
acceptance factor in the technical community offingerprinting experts.2s Once, the government
moved for reconsideration ofthe order, his mind changed. Even in his second case however,
Pollak still would not deny his doubt of the expertise in the area of identifuing a fingerprint with
statistical backing. This is an outlier from the court's created image that fingerprinting experts
are without fail, mainly due to their reliance on the practice for over 100 years. What is
interesting, and not often addressed is that a factfinder would never challenge a fingerprinting
expert's identification. What is meant by this is that it is unlikely that a fact finder would even be
informed enough on the error rates and lack ofstatistical testing which Pollak was concemed
with, and therefore would never challenge or even assess the expert's opinion. This is in addition
to the a fact that will later be explained of which experts in the field blindly tend to agree with
themselves. This creates a dangerous situation where the expert is speaking on an identification
ofa latent print to an individual with zero constructive assessment made by the factfinder. In
fact, through my research, I was unable to find a single instance where a challenged expert
witness testimony was excluded from the jury. Judge Pollak explaircd in Llera II, that the error
rate portion of Daubert was met, because of thefailure to show evidence of mistakes in prior
instances.2a
"lt has been open to defense counsel to present examples oferroneous identifications
attributable to FBI examiners, and no such examples have been forthcoming. I conclude,
22 Llera-Plaza a|564.
23 td. qt 565.
24 Id.
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therefore, on the basis of the limited information in the record as expanded, that there is
no evidence that the error rate ot certified FBI fingerprint examiners is unacceptably
high."2s
Therefore, since no such challenges are ever brought forth, expert witness' do not work to
prove this data and it was an easy way for Pollak to "change his mind" to satisfy the prosecution.
Iferror rates were force to be fumished, and factfinders challenged expert witnesses to illustrate
evidence that the latent print error rates exist, then potentially their opinions would not be so
untouchable. This second opinion seemed more like a response to the prosecutorial up cry to the
initial ruling rather than Pollak's actual beliefs. Another 702 challenge to Daubert standards on
fingerprinting.shortly followed and resulted in an upholding of admissibility of fingerprint
experts' testimonies, with the Court deeming analysis, "the very archetype ofreliable testimony"
under the Daubert and Kumho Tire standards.26 \n Hwvard, the court said fingerprinting passes
Dauberl becatse the results were said to be ofa low enor rate, capable oftesting, objective, and
subjected to peer review for 100 years through the adversary system.27
Following Pollak's second decision, United States v. Crlsp shifted the burden of proof on
the defendant.28 The Court elaborated that, "while the principles underlying fingerprint
identification have not attained the status ofscientific law, they nonetheless bear the imprimatur
ofa strong general acceptance, not only in the expert community, but in the courts as well."2e
However, in a dissenting opinion, Judge Michael questioned the lack of studies to establish how
likely it is for partial prints originating from a crime scene to match only a single set ofprint in
the whole world.3o He additionally was concemed with the lack of an error rate demonstrated by
25 Id. at 566.
26 (JS. u. Haward,260 F.3d 597, 56 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 900 (7th Cir. 2001).
27 Id. at 599.
28 US. u. Crisp, 324 F.3d261,60 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1486 (4th Cir. 2003).
2e Id. at261.
30 Id. at273.
-l
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science rather than assumptions, and the fact that a generally acceptance within the fingerprint I
I
community did not meet Dauberl standards.3r I
Related to Judge Michael's doublson partialrprints-rel iability, Uniled Stotes v. George . *
was a Seventh Circuit case where the court affirmed fingerprinting experts to be generally
accepted due to a low error rate and objective testing, but responded to the defendant's challenge
to the identification of a padal print by stating that those questions are best left to the jury.32
A terrorist bombing occurred in Madrid in 2011, leading to the FBI to "identify" Brandon
Mayfield, a United States citizen as the source of the crime scene latent prints.3l Confirmation
bias served a role in the FBI, and lead to the agreement that it had been Mr. Mayfield's print.3a
However, it tumed out that they had the wrong guy, and their identification had been incorrect.3s
Upon arresting Mayfield, the FBI described the fingerprint match as "100%o correct".36 This is an
interesting contrast to the claims of fingerprinting having a zero-error rate, as will be discussed
below.
III. History of Fingerprinting Usage
Although fingerprints have been found dating back to prehistoric times, Professor Paul-
Jean Coulier, of Val-de-Grace in Paris, first published his observation that latent fingerprints
3t Id. at276.
32 Unired States v. George,363 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.2004).
13 Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, Sarah Kershaw, New York Times, National
Section, June 5,2004.
34 Id.
3s Id.
36 David Heath & Hal Bemton, FBI Admits Fingerprint Error, Clearing Portland Attorney,
Seattle Times, (May 25,2004).
could be developed on paper through iodine fuming.37 He went on to find how to preserve
iodine prints and identifu them through the use of magnification.38 Since then, fingerprinting
has becn.use.,l..in identifying criminals for over' 100.:,;ars3e Irr-hllions.of computer automated
systems, no two humans have had identical fingerprints.ao It has remained a staple of criminal
identification, and heavily used as forensic evidence. Worldwide, fingerprints have "lead to
more suspects and generate more evidence in court than all other forensic laboratory
techniques combined."ar A critical characteristic about human fingerprints is that they do not
change over time, unlike other parts ofthe body. For this reason, the United States Justice
Department first began using fingerprints for criminal identification in 1905.42
ln 1912, the State oflllinois hanged Thomas Jennings, for murder, by matching his
fingerprint to the crime scene.as Since then, fingerprints have been used through friction
ridge analysis in crime scene prints matching, and became widely accepted.aa This Jennings
print identification had been done by latent fingerprint examiner, and began the practice of
using identifiable fingerprints for criminal convictions for the next 100 years. State v. Kuhl
was a 1918 case that established admissibility of palmprints as a proof of identifoing an
individual where a bloody print was left on an envelope.as Larer, Stacy v. Slale ruled that
37 Coulier, P.-J. Les vapeurs d'iode employees comme moyen de reconnaitre l'alteration des
ecritures. In L'Annee scientiJique et industrielle; Figuier, L. Ed.; Hachette, 1863; 8, pp 157-160
at http://gallica.bfi .frl arkl l2148lbpt6k7326j (as of March 201 0).
38 Id.
3ehttps://www.acschools.org/cms/lib/PA01916405/Centricity/Domainl362/The%o20History%20of
%2 0FingerprintsUpdated%2 02 1 %o20 Atgtst%o2020 1 2.p df
40 Id.
4l t)
42 Id. at 2.
a3 People v Jennings,252lll. 534,96 N.E. 1077 (1911).
aa Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from lhe Low's Formative Encounters with
Forensic ldentificdtion Science,49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1100 {1 (1998).
as State v Kuhl,42 Nev. 195, 175 P. 190 (1918).
fingerprint evidence alone was sufficient to support a conviction without necessary
corroboration of additional facts.a6
Einge.l''rint idsptifie2llnn-is premised on three main claims;.(!.r\ that all ;..,lividrrals
possess permanent and unique sets of prints; (2) fingerprint examiners can identifu the source
of a latent print at a crime, and exclude non-matchesaT; and (3) that fingerprint identification
has zero or close to zero error rate.48 Therefore, courts have long used these expert witnesses
in order to gain hard evidence against criminals who were later matched based on their prints.
However, much to the same thought as Judge Pollak's questioning the fingerprinting
experts' abilities, there have been questions into the validity of experts' ability to accurately
identiff latent prints. DNA exonerations have been ever-so prevalent, and the number of such
occurrences are constantly rising.ae This rise gives question to the long held belief that
evidence such as ballistics, bite marks, and blood splatter which used to be deemed as hard
evidence, actually lack reliability. s0 What is most convincing is the 2009 report from the
National Academy of Sciences titled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United Stqtes: A
Path Forward (NAS report). The report notably stated that, "with the exception of nuclear
DNA analysis. . no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
a6 stacyv state,49 okl. crim. t54,292 P. 885 (1930).
a7 Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorl s: Litigating Post-conviction Claims of Fingerprint
MisidentificationAfter the NAS Report,2010 UTAH L. REV.267,213 (2010).
48 Id. at274.
4e TI.INOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction (last
visited Apr. 5, 2019).
s0 Carrie Sperling, llhen Finality and Innocence Collide, in Controversies in Innocence Cases in
America 139,157.
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and a specific individual or source."5l This report was even acknowledged by the United
States Supreme Court, in which they stated that many forensic experts and claims had
deficiencies.s2 Overall. th.'ugh, wirh J.he. evception of Pollak's initial decision,.corrrts have-. .,.. . ....,
been weary to disallow fingerprinting experts. Instead, courts have relied on the adversarial
process of the legal system to cross-examine and explain the reliability concems of
fingerprinting experts.sl This however raises further concems, such as the pressure that then
lands on defense counsel to contend and oppose evidence offingerprint identification which
the jury can easy add a false credit to. What is meant by this is that a jury member may see a
blowup of fingerprints, think "hmm this looks pretty similar, plus it's an expert! What does
this defense attomey know about fingerprinting that this experf does not?" That then
effectively puts defendants with sub-par defense teams at a significant disadvantage when the
average juror is presented with the information.
IV. Criticism of Fingerprinting Experts and the NAS Report
It would be a foggy question to corsider Dauberl standards ifJudge Pollak's original order
stood, or one day becomes the norm. Would this order that fingerprinting experts could not
testify suggest there is a limit to Dauberl itself, or fingerprints specifically? This is because
experts' techniques and abilities to truly identify latent prints have not been validated, however
they have been able to testify for more than 100 years that they certainly can do that exact
thing.s4 They have testified that with certainty, fingerprints from a latent print belonged to an
5r National Research Council (U.S.). Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A
Path Forward.2009.
s2 Id.
53 Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to
Developments in Forensic Science,33 P ACE L. REV. 234,235-36 (2013).
s4 ld.
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individual in question, yet, there were never a statistical basis to validate the claims ofthese
testimonies that put those people behind bars.
.., . -.On the contrary, fingerprinting erperts.provide ".'.'nething concrete. They can extract a latent. .,-
print from an object or a place, then compare it with a fingerprint ofan individual. They can
identifu ridges, shapes, and pattems that match to the latent print and with a certainty say that the
print belonged to that individuals5. Meanwhile, others argue that courts allow less reliable
testimony with great regularity, such as eyewitness testimony, from lay witness.s6 Therefore,
although the lack ofstatistical backing to some olthe fingerprinting matches should not
outweigh the identifuing features that fingerprint experts can provide to a criminal trial but not so
far as to identify an individual from a latent print. However, the previously mentioned 2009
National Academy of Sciences report highly criticized the abilities ofthese fingerprinting
experts.5T
The NAS report criticized fingerprint friction ridge practices.s8 It explained how a person's
finger leaves an imprint, with ridges on whatever surface they touch, that stays visible if left
unaltered.se The friction ridge analysis is the practice of taking that latent print that is left behind
at a crime scene and identi$ing it with a suspect's prints.60 The standard method used by the FBI
and fingerprint experts in America is the "Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification"
method also known as 
(ACE-V'61 
Analysis using this method uses two steps to evaluate a print,
s5 Id.
s6 Id.
-td
58 National Research Council (U.S.). Strengthening Forensic Science in the Ihnited States; A
Path Forward.2009.
se Id.
60 Id.
6t McMurtie note 3 at 270-71.
72
at three levels ofdetail: (1) The flow and direction of the ridges, (2) Examination ofeach
individual's ridges and characteristics specific to them, (3) and a deep look into the pores ofthe
4ages.62 ft. l21g.r't.print is first looked at, followerlby thp.- individ',qljs..pdnt to determine if they
are deemed a match.63 The expert does this by taking a look at the ridges, similarity, relationship
and sequence, but maintain that there is no specific formula or benchmark to qualifi, as a
match.6a The expert then performs the evaluation and concludes that the prints are either a match
or not a match, which is based on nothing more than experience and judgment.65 The finat step
of ACE-V involves a second examiner taking a look at the prints in order to verifu the initial
examiner's determination.66 The extremely interesting factor of this final step, is that the
confirming expert knows the initial expert's determination before taking an intendent view ofthe
print.67 This can obviously lead to the second examiner having a confirmation bias, and a
tendency to not want to oppose the initial expert's opinion.
As a result, the NAS report criticized many areas of ACE-V, beginning with specificity
concems, reporting that a validated method does not exist because ofthe loose requirements for
matches.68 They stated, "it does not guard against bias; is too broad to ensure repeatability and
transparency; and does not guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the same
results."6e The report also criticized the lack of documentation ofanalysis, and questioned the
claims of a zero error rate.70 Lastly, it stated that much more research is required into the ridge
62 United States v. Aman,748 F. Supp.2d 531, 539 (2010).
63 Id.
64 t)
6s ld.
66 Id.
67 ld.
68 NAS Report at 142.
6e Id.
7o Id. al 143.
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pattems and varying qualities oflatent prints.il This report has certainly been helpful for defense
counsel to use against the validity and reliability of fingerprinting experts, however the ACE-V
analysis.is.still.heavily t.',1. ..'-
The analysis basically encourages fellow fingerprinting expert witnesses to agree with each
other, rather than actually check the validity ofprint identifications. Ifan expert witness tried to
come to ajudge and oppose the fingerprinting expert for the FBI, they would be deemed as not
an expert because of their inability to confirm something "so obvious."72 It is easy to see how
this quickly becomes a situation where experts confirm their colleague's rulings, and none will
challenge the determination of another because then they are deemed to not be an expert. It
simply becomes standard, or final to take what the initial expert determines and stick with it. If
someone were to oppose it they would be demoted in a sense, to have the same knowledge as a
lay witness because they couldn't see the determination that the "true" expert had made.73 An
eye raising and somewhat comical testimony from a head olthe FBI's head fingerprint unit
occurred in United States v. Baines.Ta The expert told the court that the analysis used by the FBI
had an error rate of one per 1 I million cases, based on his knowledge of the agency perform ing
that many searches and only having one error.75 This misleading estimate is what continues to
lead to an acceptance of whatever an expert matches on a fingerprint analysis because you would
have to be "obviously wrong" to think that something with a "zero error rate" is incorrect. What
becomes super interesting about this commonplace acceptance is that none ofthe FBI
7t Id. at 144.
12 ld.
73 ld.
7a United Stales v. Baines,573 F.3d 979,990_91
75 Id.
(1Oth Cir. 2009).
l4
fingerprinting experts from the previously discussed Brandon Mayfield misidentification were
ever fired, or demoted as experts despite the extreme blunder.
V. Post NAS Report
In2009, an individual challenged the admissibility of fingerprints that matched him to a
carjacking in Maryland. The Court ruled that the acceptance of the ACE-V method in the
fingerprint community as well as the lack of evidence to explain the near nonexistence of
misidentification met the Daubert standard.T6 This of course, is due to the above discussed
expectahcy to confirm an initial expert's determination of whether or not prints were a match.
The Court instead backed the idea that the United States Supreme Court uses in Daubert which
emphasizes cross-examination, presenting contrary evidence, and burden of proof instruction as
the method to attack perceived flaws when admitting technical or scientific evidence.TT
The following year, a Massachusetts court acknowledged the reliability concems outlined in the
NAS report and stated,
"While we normally leave the humbling of inflated opinions to cross-examination, there is a
danger that the mystique of fingerprint identification, which has had a captivating hold on the
criminal justice system and society at large for more than one hundred years, is such that
cross-examination may not be enough to rectify the effect of a fingerprint expert's use of
such terms as "individualized," "absolute," and "match" when testifuing, as opposed to
presenting the testimony as his or her "opinion" that the latent fingerprints are the
defendant's."78
This is as earlier described, the problem with leaving it to the defense counsel and actually
places them at a disadvantage before even saying a word to the jury. It is difficult to convince a
lay member of a jury that the lawyer, who went to law school, and studied humanities or writing
76 (Jnited states v.
77 Id.
78 Commonwealth
Rose, 672F. Supp. 2d 723, 725-26 (D. Md. 2009).
v. Gambora,933 N.E.2d 50 (2010)'
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intensive subjects in undergraduate school, knows more than an "expert" on the topic of
fingerprinting. Also since a match of"807o" is not allowed, and the words "absolute" are
-.-.,neccssary for identification, once a patch ,is-deemed-\ethe-expert it is hard for a lay person.to.. - ,.*
refute. 7e In addition to this hurdle, a fellow expert on fingerprinting will not challenge a
previously made identification because they will be characterized as "lay" on the topic because
they couldn't see this verified identification like the expert who presented it did. Experts are
simply very influential onjuries, and it later becomes tough to change their mind. Additionally,
mostjurors think that fingerprinting is scientific and that it is a fool proof method of
identification.80 The Gambola conrt also provided a restriction to usage of identification
evidence in stating, "based on the NAS Report, we can say this much at the present time:
testimony to the effect that a latent print matches, or is "individualized" to, a known print, if it is
to be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions expressing absolute
certainty about, or the infallibility of, an "individualization" ofa print should be avoided."8r This
is a huge step in the direction of deeming fingerprinting expert witnesses unable to identifu an
individual's print and a latent one. However, although judicial decisions began commenting and
even siding with the arguments of the NAS report, much like courts prior to its release with the
exception ofJudge Pollak, they continued to conclude that precedent and the adversary process
are what keep fingerprinting experts testifying.
Another case which the Court commented on the NAS report was a fingerprint
identification leading to an arson fire suspect.82 The court stated that the absence of known error
7s Id.
80 Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to
Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 189, I199 (2004).
8t Gambora,933 N.E.2d at 61
82 United States v. Aman,748 F. Supp. 2d531,532 (E.D. Va.20l0).
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rates, judgment calls, and the lack ofstudies in general put serious question into the value of
friction ridge analysis.83 They commented on the idea of fingerprinting experts maintaining a
.zero perceni.otrcr rate and making definite matches..with.serious concem Lnd that it was, "not
scientifically plausible."8a They did however, deny the defendant's challenge and left it for cross-
examination to handle.8s Thesejudicial decisions continued to acknowledge the glaring problems
with fingerprinting experts, however continued to allow such testimony and opinions into the
courtrooms.
Moving forward , United States v. Slone, furthered the avoidance by courts to take a
similar stance as Judge Pollak did, and continued to defer the concems oferror rates and false
positive identifications to defense counsel.86 The court agreed that, "when a principle is well-
established, the questions are simply whether the expert properly applied the established
scientific principle to the facts and whether the expert's credibility is compromised for reasons
such as bias. These are matters that ajury usually is competent to evaluate after cross-
examination and presentation of competing expert testimony."87 This further pushed the issue of
expert testimonies out of the hand ofthe court, and placed the pressure on the defense counsel.
The problem with this continuous deferment by the courts is the earlier described
challenge that attomeys on the defense face. Beyond the previously described doubt that jurors
will have in the "expert vs. lawyer" bias, the lawyers truly to some degree cannot understand
some ofthe intricacies of fingerprints. There is a gap between the expert's training and the
lawyer's understanding of fingerprints. Much like thejudges, who generally accept the
83 Id. at 541.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 United States v. Stone,848 F. Supp. 2d714,716 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
87 Id. at7l9.
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fingerprinting expert's identification as valid, lawyers lack the knowledge and training to
understand what portions ofthe identification to attack. That is why the lack of comprehension
leads to a..genepl..allowan"e.of th!s information to proceed, especiall;, rr/hsn p6i16rl ..yi1t!. thg
previously discussed fact that fellow fingerprinting experts agree with themselves. In additjon, it
is unlikely that a common juror can even weigh expert testimony fairly, because of the
predisposition to believe that the expert is obviously correct or else they would not be there.
There was a study conducted which showed thatjurors also made decisions based on expert
testimony using language such as "match" when making and identification.88 This is an
interesting fact coupled with the discussed issue that fingerprinting experts stale they are
"absolute" in their decisions, rather than using language such as "likely a match."8e "Research
suggests that statements made by experts are given considerable deference byjurors and their
impact is unlikely to be undone either through cross-examination or rebuttal witnesses,"e0 which
then creates a pointless cross-examination attempt by the defense. It is almost as if by the time
the defense begins their adversarial process, the layjuror has already made up their mind.
November 2017 brought a state appellate case, North Corolino v. McPhaul to the
forefront of the fingerprinting discussion.el The prosecution introduced a standard expert
testimony matching crime scene latent prints to a suspect.e2 McPhaul was indicted on attempted
first degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault for robbing a Domino'sPizza
driver.e3 The driver, who was knocked unconscious said all he remembered was two men with
s8 Dawn McQuiston-surrett & Michael Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in the I'orensic
Identification sciences: Accuracy ond Impdcl, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 1159, 1165 (2008).
89 r)
90 t)
er State v. McPhaul, 808 S.E.2d 294 (]{.C. Ct. App. 2017)'
e2 Id.
n'Id.
18
dreadlocks attacking him.ea The police then tracked the I.P. address that ordered the pizza to a
house and fotnd pizza and chicken wing boxes with shipping labels that matched the spot ofthe
attack.es An expert waslhen h'ought int.r.explein how the prints are taken, and-explai.-ed the
standard practice leading her to the conclusion that the print left on the pizza delivery car
definitely, without question matched that ofthe one on the pizza box.e6 The court questioned
how such a definite conclusion was obtained, and was given an explanation how the expert went
"back and forth" until the two sets ofprints satisfied the expert's standard to match them.ei The
expert also stated the standard practice ofthere not being an set point of similarity being
necessary to match prints, and confirmed that the second examiner did not complete a blind
review.e8 This is exactly as described throughout this paper, the same standard that all
fingerprinting experts use. Yet here, the Judge pressed what exactly was done to analyze and
match the prints, and did not readily accept the unquestioned process that fingerprinting experts
usually explain. Thejury convicted McPhaul anyway and the defense appealed.ee They appealed
on the fact ofthe expert not providing testimony prior to offering her opinions which would
show that she used well established methods in her analysis ofthe latent print.roo The defense
really pushed the fact that the expert had only testified that the prints are a match because they
were found a match, without the reasons for them actually being a match.l0l The appellate court
ruled in favor ofthe defense and stated that the expert, "provided no detail in testifling how she
e4 Id.
es Id. at7 .
e6 Id.
e1 Id. at9.
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arrived at her actual conclusion in rftls specific case."l02 In the end, McPhaul was still found
guilty because ofthe severity and amount of evidence against him, however the question into the
-'eliahility of fingerprinting experts w4syet.again bror '.rl'l inro-question.l0l
VI. PCAST Report
In 2016 The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) released
a report on forensic science in criminal courts.l04 PCAST is the leading advisory body to the
executive branch.l05 The purpose was to determine whether additional steps were available on
the scientific spectrum, beyond those taken since the release of the NAS report, to help ensure
the validity of forensic evidence used in the legal system.r06 PCAST noted that there were two
major portions ofthe process that needed to be addressed. The need to evaluate specific forensic
methods to determine whether they have been scientifically established, reliable and valid, which
included fingerprinting.loi Also, the report stated that there was a need for clarity about the
scientific standards for reliability and validity within the specific forensic methods.l08
Specifically relating to fingerprints, the report recommended that the FBI laboratory should
undertake a vigorous research program to improve forensic science, building on its recent
important work on latent-fi ngerprint analysis. loe
r02 McPhaul, 808 S.E.2d 294,305 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting the expert testimony).
to3 Id. at3o6.
roa President's Council ofAdvisors on Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Forensic
Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods 9-l I
(201 6).
105 Celebrating the Contributions ofthe President's Council ofAdvisors on Science and
Technology, White House. (April 16,2019).
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The PCAST report additionally recommended the National Institutes of Standards and
Technology should take a leadership role in transforming latent print analysis, "from currently
. 51,hj.ective m.,thods-,rvith their heavy reliance on humarujl'dgement,.into ehj.ective methods, in
which standardized, quantifiable processes require little or no judgment."ll0 Since its release, the
report has been considered and discussed amongst the community, but the same standards have
continued to be adopted by courts. The National District Attorneys Association's response to the
PCAST report was not welcoming:
"The PCAST position regarding the use of forensic science is scientifically inesponsible.
Adopting any of their recommendations would have a devastating effect on the ability of law
enforcement, prosecutors and the defense bar, to fully investigate their cases, exclude innocent
suspects, implicate the guilty, and achieve true justice at trial. . .Notwithstanding the lack of 
,
qualifications, PCAST has taken it upon itself to usurp the Constitutional role of the Courts and
decades of legal precedent and insert itself as the final arbiter of the reliability and admissibility
of the information generated through these forensic science disciplines."lll
The Attorney General, Loretta Lynch spoke on behalf of the United States Justice
Department in stating, we appreciate their contribution to the field of scientific inquiry, the
department will not be adopting the recommendations related to the admissibility of forensic
science evidence."l12 This was the general response from most agencies, and no real movements
were made following the PCAST report, which could have sparked some movement to force
tto J4.
ttt 5p44 Press Release on the PCAST Report, (Sept. 2,2016),
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fingerprinting experts to document and heighten their identification standards. In reality, this is
the same type ofresponse that Judge Pollak received in 2002 which sparked his quick
backpedaling fro-. his initi.l decicion.
VII. Conclusion
In the actual Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. opinion where the standard originated, the
Supreme Court listed five factors on whether or not ajudge should admit testimony based on
scientific evidence; (1) whether the evidence "can be tested" using the scientific methodl13; (2)
whether it has "been subjected to peer review and publication;"r t4 (3) the "known or potential
rate of error" of the technique in question;ll5 (4) the "existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation;"116 and (5) the "general acceptance" of the technique
within the relevant scientific community.l l7
The first factor oftesting, as related to fingerprints is somewhat muddy because ofthe lack of
testing and rigorous research which is typically required to be deemed a scientific claim. In
reality, as there has been little testing done in the field of frngerprints. First, on the most basic
view, there are a lot of claims that no two fingerprints in the world are alike but it would be
impossible to fingerprint every person on the planet to confirm the notion. A possible way to
potentially remedy this impractical question would be to scientifically determine what the
chances of this happening would be. The FBI:r,i,the Mitchel/ case tried to make the argument and
show that this claim is true, but the methods were very flawed and overgeneralized.rr8 The
tt3 Daubert,509 U.S. 579 (1993)-
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govemment tried to prove the ability to make actual identifications by conducting a test in the
Daubert hearing.lle They sent two latent fingerprints to 53 law enforcement locations, and added
all 10 of the suspect's pri.nts r?9They aske.l.the....xaminers to see if any matches.could..l.',: made
without telling them that they should match the suspects thumb prints.12r Only 34 locations
participated, and 9 ofthose were unable to match any ofthe 10 prints to the two latent prints.r22
This is obviously a major gap, and yet the court was not swayed. This constant leaning on the
100 year reliance and "testing" of fingerprints is exactly what Judge Pollak questioned in his first
Llera opirrion.t23
"lt makes sense to rely on scientific testing, rather than "adversarial" courtroom testing,
because to rely on the latter would be to vitiate the gatekeeping role of federal trial
judges, thereby undermining the essence of Rule 702 as interpreted by the Court in
Daubert. If "adversarial" testing were the benchmark-that is if the validity of a
technique were submitted to the jury in each instance then the preliminary role ofthe
judge in determining the scientific validity ofa technique would never come into play.
Thus, even 100 years of "adversarial" testing in court cannot substitute for scientific
testing when the proposed expert testimony is presented as scientific in nature."l2a
Backers of fingerprinting experts instead continue to argue that the adversarial system is what
guides fingerprinting through the testing portion of Daubert is telling ofwhether they truly
believe their tests. Otherwise they could have just pointed to some test instead ofcontinually
reverting back to the adversarial system argument.
The second factor from the Daubert opinion is whetherjudges should admit expert
testimony based on scientific factors was publication and peer review.l25 As read throughout the
rre Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is Revealed,
7s S. CAL. L. REV. 605,60s n.3 (2002).
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variety ofcases, the first method that is often pointed to is the peer review done in the ACE-V
method. However, this leads to severe potential for confirmation bias due to the reviewer's
. know.l.dge of the originals examiner's.ident,.frcation. L...a.Jditien, my opinion is that the fact that
experts will no oppose each other, because then one ofthem is regarded in the field as not an
expert for not making such an "obvious" match is conceming. That is like a group ofstudents in
a law school class not clarifuing a mistake on an exam question because they know if no one
brings it up beforehand the professor will make it a "freebee" for the whole class. Therefore,
everyone remains silent even though they may realize there are some problems with the question
in contention. It is very surprising that apparent "experts" act in this way, in a sort ofself-
centered attempt to ensure relevancy in the fingerprinting field, fearing becoming an outcast.
The third factor in the Daubert opinion was for the judges to question the known and
potential error rate.126 This is the likelihood of a expert making a mistake when identifuing a
latent print to an individual, or failing to do so in a situation where the prints cre actually truly
matches. This is an error rate that falls on the fingerprinting expert specifically, which as
discussed throughout, has not been concretely determined and those tests that have been
conducted have yielded unreasonably high rates oferror.l2T The other type oferror is the
likelihood that fingerprints from different individuals could wrongly be declared a match, even
without examiner error such as in the Brandon Mayfield case.l28 Partial prints, placement of
latent prints in criine scenes, and distorted prints could all potentially lead to this error due to an
unclear examination. Not even print from a crime scene will be as clear as those taken when
applying for a passport. Yet fingerprinting exp€rts, as discussed, cling to the assertion that these
126 Id. at 594.
'27 Mitchnlt,365F.3d262 (3d cir. 2004).
128 Sarah Kershaw, at 2.
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type oferror rates are zero, and mistakes like this do not occur. This is an irresponsible assertion
and givesjurors, who fall quickly for "science," a false narrative ofthe actual chance for error to
.-,,occlr in fingrarinti"g.l2e ,
The fou(h and fifth factors forjudges to look to as guided by the Dauberl opinion are the
existence of standards to guide the practice of fingerprinting, and general acceptance ofthe
technique within the scientific community.l30 Outside of ACE-V, there are not many other
standard based guides in the fingerprinting community, and even that provides little in terms of
firm standards that experts must follow.r3r There is something called the "Galton Point
requirement" which the rest of the world uses to verify fingerprints, but the United States has no
set number ofpoints that need to be met in order to deem two prints a match.ll2 Every expert and
lab has their own standard for how many points can be met in order to deem a print a match.l33
Meanwhile, in Europe the general standard is l6 points, while South America requires 30.134
This is only an example of the weak standards in the United States, because most fingerprinting
experts have come together to object to the use ofa point system entirely because ofthe need to
look at latent prints with a holistic view.I3s Additionally, there is virtually zero training
requirements for fingerprinting experts, outside ofon thejob experience and training.l36 Instead,
r2e McQuiston-surrett & Michael Saks, at 59.
t3o Doubert,509 U.S. at 594.
t3t McMurtie note 3 al 270-71.
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it is more ofa "leam as you go" approach, which even further leads to major question marks into
the standards of fingerprinting experts.l3T
General-a^ceptance +f finge?rinting experts, has been extensivellr. discusse,l,in det",il as
to the crutch courts use to regularly admit testimony . Daubert was supposed to eliminate the
-Frye test of general acceptance, and yet stitl included it as a relevant factor.l3E Courts continue to
rely heavily on this factor, and the 100 years ofusage as a general acceptance strong enough to
continue its use despite the lack oftesting, blind review tactics and known error rates.l3e It seems
that the only people who truly believe that the practice offingerprinting to identify individuals is
fundamentally sound are the experts themselves.
As explained, the five factors in lhe Daubert opinion to whichjudges should look to in
order to admit testimony under rule 702 are flawed in the area of fingerprinting. In reality, the
Kuhmo standard should be applied, because fingerprinting experts are really not scientists, even
though they continue to hold themselves out to be. Courts have continued to give lhem Daubert
hearings and treat their expert opinions as scientific, as the cases exemplified. The only real
pushback on this is that courts have begun to ask fingerprinting experts to explain that they give
opinions and are not actual scientists, possibly in an effort to eliminate the previously discussed
jury bias. If properly utilized, fingerprints can continue to help foirly help identifr individuals
involved in criminal proceedings in the United States. However, at the current state ofpractice,
the ability to conduct this practice fairly is impossible. There are too many variables, no
standards, and too little guidance to continue to allow fingerprinting experts to testify on whether
a latent print has been declared a match. Judge Pollak was correct in his initial Z/era decision,
t37 ld.
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and should not have subdued to the pressure put on him to change his stance. We should at mosl
allow fingerprinting experts to give testimony on the similarities ofprint ridges and explain the
points of fingerprints. Judge Poll:k was cnrict,..nd to allow fingerprinting experts,to g.:on the
stand and "scientifically" testiry that they have determined a match to exist between a latent,
sometimes partial, print is irresponsible and goes beyond Daubert.
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